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This article reviews the current state of the EU’s development policy reform agenda.  It 
suggests that the extension of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) to this area of EU 
activity would offer significant advantages.  It reviews the EU’s experience with the OMC, 
identifies the strengths and weaknesses of this process and examines how it might relate to the 
current formulation and implementation of development policy.  
 
Introduction 
 
Considerable attention has been focused upon the relationship between the development objectives of 
EU policy, defined in terms of their contribution to poverty reduction and the Millennium Development 
Goals, and general external relations policy, reflecting the EU’s broader political, strategic and 
commercial interests. At the same time the effectiveness of the European Commission’s (EC) aid 
administration has faced continuing critical comment. This paper is intended to introduce a new element 
into this policy debate, drawing upon developments in other areas of the EU’s activities, namely the Open 
Method of Coordination (OMC) in social and economic policy. In the focus upon the internal coherence 
and consistency of EC administered aid and trade policy it will be argued that the potential for 
coordinating and enhancing Member States’ bilateral aid polices has been neglected and that this may 
offer an alternative and important role for the EC.  This paper will however focus solely upon the issue of 
aid, as the role of the EC in ensuring coherence between aid and trade policy cannot be in question, 
given the Commission’s sole competence in external trade relations. 
 
The paper begins with a brief review of the critical assessments of EC aid policy and administration and 
the reform agenda that was subsequently adopted. It then considers the current situation before turning to 
consider the OMC and the contribution that it might make to enhancing the effectiveness of both the 
Member States’ bilateral programmes and that of the EU itself. 
 
The Reform of EU Aid Policy 
 
It was not until the Maastricht Treaty on European Union in 1993 that development cooperation was 
formally recognised as a shared responsibility between the Member States and the EC. Under Article 
130u the EU was to foster “ the sustainable economic and social development of developing countries 
and their gradual integration into the world economy.” To achieve this objective Article 130u requires that 
development policy should be “complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States” and taken 
into account in the formulation of all of the EU’s policies (Article 130v).  
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Perhaps as a result of this formal recognition of the role of the EC or its growing aid budget, pressure 
grew from the Member States for a review of the performance of its aid programme.  Thus in 1995 
external consultants (e.g. Montes 1998) were employed to review the EC's assistance to the 
Mediterranean, Asia and Latin America and to the ACP countries. This review was particularly timely as it 
coincided with the negotiation of a new EU-ACP Convention, which was to run from 2000 (see Dearden 
S. & Salama C 2002). These reviews focused upon the EC’s performance in terms of clear objectives, 
coordination, transparency, accountability and institutional capabilities (Dearden 2002). 
 
The objectives of EC development policy only emerged cumulatively in the successive ACP-EU Lomé 
Conventions – poverty reduction (Lomé III), gender equality (Lomé IV), human rights, good governance 
and the rule of law (Lomé IV bis). In terms of coordination, internally the EDF Committee had failed to 
coordinate with the Council of Ministers, while externally the EC had failed to coordinate with the IMF and 
World Bank. Attempts at achieving complementarity based upon donors’ comparative advantage had 
proved inadequate, as was seen with the Co-ordination for Development in Africa in the 1980s.  At the 
same time the number of instruments of aid policy had rapidly multiplied, especially under the influence of 
the European Parliament, with increasing emphasis placed upon conditionality, following the broad 
approach of the World Bank/IMF. These changes had overburdened the EC administration and 
increasing conditionality had resulted in a loss of local ‘ownership’ of many aid programmes. Finally, 
transparency and accountability were undermined by the complexity of the EC’s aid programme and the 
weaknesses of its management structure. 
  
Overall the assessments concluded that the EC had had limited success in realising its development 
policy objectives, except for a few localised targeted programmes where there had been the close 
involvement of civil society. The failure to coordinate aid had led to international donors pursuing 
competing objectives, duplicating programmes and overburdening recipient government’s 
administrations. There had been no attempt to identify the EC’s ‘comparative advantage’ in its aid 
programme and administratively decision-making was centralised in a fragmented Brussels bureaucracy, 
with little effective monitoring or evaluation. 
  
In response to these criticisms the EC prepared a “Statement on Development Policy” (EC 2000a) and 
more detailed administrative reform proposals (EC 2000b). Poverty reduction was explicitly identified as 
the main objective of EU development policy, with priority in resource allocation to be given to low-income 
developing countries. It proposed focusing upon seven areas where it was believed the EC had a 
comparative advantage – the link between trade and development, regional integration, macro-economic 
support, transport, rural development, health and education, and institutional capacity building. The 
importance of ‘coherence’ across EU policies, especially aid and trade, and ‘co-ordination’ and 
‘complementarity’ of EC aid programmes, was explicitly recognized1. In 1998 the Development Council 
had adopted a set of Guidelines to strengthen co-operation (revised in January 2001). These Guidelines 
emphasised the importance of EU development co-ordination taking place within the context of wider 
cooperation with the IMF/World Bank and UN.  The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development has been particularly instrumental in 
encouraging donor coordination, publishing a series of good practice papers (2002) and establishing a set 
of Guidelines. These have been influential in encouraging the EC to move from project aid to a 
sectoral/general budget support approach and to adopting a policy of decentralisation (‘deconcentration’) 
of aid administration. The EC has highlighted the central role to be played by the local EC Delegations in 
the initiation of coordination through joint analysis, programme preparation, monitoring and evaluation.  
  
Organisationally Europe Aid was created to undertake the implementation of the aid cycle, while DG DEV 
was to programme aid for the ACP group of countries and DG RELEX for the rest. Country Strategy 
Papers (CSP), to be prepared in discussions with the recipient countries and with other donors, would 
assess the social, political and economic situation of each developing country and outline the EC’s 
 
1 For a detailed discussion of the challenges of achieving aid coordination see Gill & Maxwell (2004).  
© European Analysis, 2005 – All rights reserved – www.EuropeanAnalysis.com 
medium term aid strategy. ‘Rolling programming’ of aid was to be adopted and evaluation was to be given 
a much greater emphasis. Overall the reform proposals commit the EC to a “the orientation of 
programming towards results, [and] the development of an appraisal culture…”.  
 
Progress  
 
By 2004 considerable progress had been made (EC 2004). The new management information tool for 
reporting, planning and forecasting – the Common Reflex Information System (CRIS) - had been 
implemented. Since 2002 an Office Quality Support Group within EuropeAid has appraised the 
implementation of 200 projects, while progress has been made in simplifying tendering and contracting 
procedures. The Interservice Quality Support Group (iQSG) has continued to have a central role in 
assessing Country Strategy Paper’s and by 2004 the mid term reviews had been completed for all 
countries except the ACPs. Country Fact Files have also been drafted jointly with the Member States to 
summarise all agreements and contracts between the EU and the recipient country, in order to enhance 
coordination. Since 2002 the EC has been involved with a pilot exercise to further improve EU 
harmonisation in Vietnam, Nicaragua, Mozambique and Morocco. In the health sector joint Action Plans 
have been developed, with joint appraisals, pooled technical assistance and joint financing. At the 
international level the EC-World Bank Framework for donor co-operation was revised in 2002 and the EC-
UN Framework in 2003. This reflects the clear recognition of the need for aid harmonisation amongst all 
donors in order to reduce the administrative burden upon the recipient countries and to diminish the 
uncertainty in aid flows, which inhibits long run planning. Finally, the problem of the coordination of the 
transition from humanitarian aid programmes, under ECHO administration, to the longer-term 
development phase of country support was addressed in the establishment of an inter-service group. 
  
Nonetheless the EC’s own monitoring of its aid administration had identified a number of areas requiring 
improvement. Reviews of the country strategies had found that they often failed to adequately address 
problems of poor governance, corruption, human rights and weak government commitment to 
development policies. The expected impact of EC aid programmes was often found to be far too 
ambitious, with an overoptimistic assessment of the recipient countries administrative capacity. Particular 
problems also arose with the integration of the cross-cutting gender objectives into development 
programmes (Lister 2003).  Finally, implementation was still being impeded by lengthy administrative 
processes, with management hampered by the limited use of proper reporting, monitoring and evaluation. 
A further assessment is provided by the Results-Orientated Monitoring (ROM) undertaken by the 
Evaluation Unit, which in 2003 reviewed 903 projects, worth € 7 bn. (EC 2004). ROM considers the 
relevance of design, efficiency in implementation, effectiveness in delivering benefits, impact and 
sustainability. While overall the results were satisfactory, the sustainability of EC funded projects was 
identified as the major weakness, suggesting the need for more clearly defined exit strategies.  
  
However a number of broader issues remain unresolved and the EU’s development policy and the EC’s 
administration continue to be subject to criticism (e.g. House of Commons 2002, Santiso 2002, Mackie et 
al 2003, Maxwell & Engel 2003). Concern continues to be expressed at the bias in EC assistance towards 
the middle-income developing countries (60% EC ODA in 2000). This reflects the ambiguity of the EU’s 
development policy when implemented within the wider context of the Communities external relations. 
Thus the ‘near-abroad’ (the Mediterranean and the Central/Eastern Europe) has received a 
disproportionate share of funding, reflecting broader security concerns. In all relationships with developing 
countries considerations of security, trade and investment are likely to be of some importance, while the 
new emphasis upon human rights, good governance and the rule of law has introduced more explicit 
political considerations. 
  
The issue of the conflict between development objectives and external relations considerations is 
reflected in the debate about the organisational structure of the EC. Concern continues as to the division 
of programming between DG DEV and DG RELEX, the separation of implementation from EuropeAid and 
the role of ECHO. The subsuming of the Council of Development Ministers into the General Affairs 
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External Relations Council is indicative of the primacy that is likely to be given to broader external 
relations considerations.  This would have been enhanced by the establishment of an EU Foreign 
Minister as envisioned in the draft Constitution. The Convention Working Group which examined external 
relations (CONV 459/02) recognised “the fostering of economic and social development of the developing 
countries, with the primary aim to eradicate poverty”, but as only one of the eight objectives of EU 
external action. The ambiguity remained, for whilst “development policy has a specific purpose, 
development assistance should also be considered as an element of the global strategy of the EU.”  Any 
new constitutional provisions would also determine the overall size of the College of Commissioners, 
which in turn would have a major influence on the Commission’s internal organisational structure. A group 
of RELEX Commissioners, including the ‘EU Foreign Minister’, seemed the most likely outcome, although 
there remained doubts as to whether this would necessarily include a Development Commissioner.  
 
The organisational structure for administering the EU’s development policy is widely recognised as 
unsatisfactory (Mackie et al 2003) and change is likely even without the adoption of a new constitutional 
treaty.  
  
Administratively a number of issues remain outstanding. The existing budget management system fails to 
clearly identify the funding for specific activities, undermining transparency. Whilst considerable progress 
has been made in establishing Country Strategy Papers (CSP) as central to the policy formation process 
concerns remain about the consistency of their quality, their ability to deal with cross cutting issues, their 
analytical depth and contribution to donor coordination. The CSPs were intended to ensure EC aid 
programmes are coordinated and complimentary to EU Member State bi-lateral programmes as well as 
those of other multi-lateral donors such as the World Bank, through their relationship to the country’s 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Comprehensive Development Framework. Doubts have also 
been expressed as to the degree of participation by recipient governments and their civil societies in the 
formulation of the CSPs, which is regarded as central to fostering local commitment through ‘ownership’.  
  
Implementation through rolling programming has also raised questions about the administrative burden 
this may place upon developing countries civil services. Similarly, although by 2004 deconcentration to 61 
Delegations had been completed and almost 1,600 additional staff transferred, the effectiveness of the 
programme remains to be fully assessed, especially in regard to the enhancement of their policy role. 
Finally, the degree to which the EC’s development administration has been transformed from a legalistic 
bureaucracy to a ‘learning organisation’ remains open to question. The enhancement of the evaluation 
function and its effectiveness in influencing policy revision is central to this transformation. This is 
especially true given the movement towards general budget support and away from specific project aid.  
In 2003 €770 m. was committed to budget support in 19 ACP countries. Whilst this may be 
administratively convenient it presents more significant problems of monitoring and evaluation. However, 
a joint evaluation of a general budget support is currently being undertaken with the Development 
Assistance Committee of the OECD and this may addressed some of these issues. But above all 
concerns have been expressed at the excessive emphasis upon disbursement rates, rather than impact 
assessments, in discussions as to the EC’s administrative performance. 
  
At a more fundamental level the debate continues as the future role of the EC in development assistance. 
Whilst the EC has sole competence in negotiating international trade arrangements and therefore in 
ensuring the coherence of the relationship between development and trade policy in regard to the 
developing world, its role in the delivery of aid is more uncertain. In a political environment where the 
Member States of the EU are committed to greater integration and exhibit a clear commitment to poverty 
reduction as the prime focus of their development policy, the EC would be expected to account for a 
growing proportion of the EU’s total overseas aid. By contrast a weakening of the commitment to 
collective action, with an emphasis upon subsidiarity, perhaps reflecting the diverging views amongst the 
Member States as to the objectives of development policy, could lead to the repatriation of development 
policy back to national governments. In this latter political environment it would be important not to lose 
sight of the important contribution that the EC might make to enhancing the effectiveness of national 
bilateral aid programmes. Intra-EU coordination of Member States’ aid policies is a role for the EC that 
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has received the least attention in the debate about the future direction of EU development policy. It is to 
this that I now wish to turn. 
 
The Open Method of Coordination 
 
Disch (1999) provides a useful framework for discussing coordination.  He identifies five levels at which 
coordination can occur - international, regional, national, sub-national and sectoral – and three levels of 
content and intensity.  The ‘content’ of coordination includes broad policy objectives, embracing both 
principles and priorities; formal procedures, i.e. institutional rules and regulations and informal practices. 
The three degrees of ‘intensity’ range from ‘consultation’, with information sharing, through ‘co-operation’, 
where discussion takes place in order to identify areas in which harmonisation is possible, to 
“collaboration” where there is shared implementation of common policies. The question to be addressed 
here is how far the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) can contribute to increasing the intensity of EU 
coordination across all three aspects of ‘content’ – from policy convergence in Brussels to informal 
practices in the country Delegations. 
  
The origins of the OMC lie in the Lisbon European Council (March 2000), which heralded its introduction 
as the primary means of spreading best practice and achieving greater policy convergence within the EU. 
It is intended to foster learning across the Member States through a range of instruments.  These include 
the following :- 
 
• Establishing quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks as a means of comparing 
best practice. 
• Establishing guidelines for Member States, with specific timetables for their achievement, in the 
short, medium and long-term. 
• Translating these guidelines into national policies, with specific targets. 
• Periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review. 
• Council Recommendations 
 
So far the OMC has been applied, to varying degrees, to a large number of policy areas (see Radaelli 
2003).  It has been employed most explicitly as the main working method in the following areas :- 
 
• Broad Economic Policy Guidelines 
• European Employment Strategy 
• Social inclusion. 
• Pensions. 
• Research and innovation. 
• Information society. 
 
In other policy areas the EU has indicated its intention to employ the OMC, but so far there is little 
evidence of progress.  These areas include :- 
• Education. 
• Environmental policy. 
• Migration and asylum. 
• Better regulation 
• Healthcare. 
 
In the case of direct taxation there has been no explicit commitment to OMC but its approach has been 
utilised.  
  
Central to the debate about the OMC is the question as to whether it is intended to encourage the 
adoption of best practice or to foster convergence towards common EU goals.  This has been described 
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in the distinction between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ learning (Checkel 1998).  In the case of ‘thin learning’ Member 
States benefit from the knowledge they acquire of how to more efficiently achieve their established 
objectives.  By contrast, in the case of ‘thick learning’ the objectives themselves are modified through 
their participation in the learning network; that is, it fosters political convergence.  ‘Convergence’ is itself a 
difficult concept (see Politt 2001), which can range from merely the sharing of a common conceptual 
framework to the convergence of objectives based upon a shared world view. In the case of the EU’s 
development policy both functions would make a significant contribution to the enhancement of its 
effectiveness. 
  
Thus the OMC might contribute to the dissemination of best practice in the implementation of national 
development policies across the Member States of the EU, both in terms of programming and 
implementation.  At the same time the creation of a learning network, inclusive of the EC, would 
contribute significantly to the achievement of coordination and complementarity in the Member States 
bilateral programmes and that of the EC itself. At the administrative level it should also foster the 
harmonisation of procedures that would reduce the significant burden upon recipient governments. 
Central to the establishment of a learning network under the OMC is the process of systematic evaluation 
of policy implementation. In the context of EU and national development policy, evaluations and their 
effective and systematic inclusion in policy formulation, has failed to receive the attention that it requires.  
This has become a particularly important issue with the move away from project aid to budget support.  
Evaluation of the effectiveness of the broader economic policies of recipient countries, placed within an 
environmental, political and social context, presents particular challenges for all aid donors. The adoption 
of the OMC should encourage the development of an effective methodology and the avoidance of 
duplication. 
  
Participation is also seen as a central feature of the OMC process, especially if it is to be extended 
beyond ‘top-down’ to encompass ‘bottom-up’ learning. Again in the development policy context 
‘participation’ is seen as crucial to the effectiveness of aid programmes. Within Member States more 
systematic participation of the NGO community and business organisations may enhance the 
effectiveness of aid policy formation and its implementation. But even more importantly, without the 
involvement of recipient government’s, ‘ownership’ of aid strategies will be lost and delivery impaired. In 
the case of states where public administrations are inadequate or where the political environment is 
unstable or unrepresentative, the emphasis has turned to the role of civil society’s organisations (non-
state actors (NSA)). Such grassroots participation can easily be accommodated within the context of a 
broader OMC ‘bottom-up’ approach. 
  
Further, central to the EC’s development policy implementation is the role of the Country Strategy Papers 
(CSP).  Similar documents are prepared by many of the aid agencies of the EU’s Member States. Such 
documents are usually closely related to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, prepared under the 
aegis of the World Bank, by many developing countries. The OMC should enhance the role of such 
Country Strategy Papers in harmonising national and EC aid programmes. The preparation of such CSPs 
is intended to take place in consultation with recipient government’s and NSAs. Such local participation is 
intended to be supported by the EC’s commitment to deconcentration; that is, the enhancement of the 
role of local Delegations in the aid policy formulation process. Again such administrative innovations 
should be enhanced within the context of an OMC process that emphasises ‘bottom-up’ learning. 
  
The OMC will involve the employment of indicators, both quantitative and qualitative, and their use in 
benchmarking. A catalogue of indicators has emerged at the country level as part of the assessment 
criteria of the implementation of the CSP programmes. Similarly the OECD/DAC country reviews might 
provide a methodological framework for EU monitoring and evaluations and provide a basis for a system 
of internal peer review. The extent of the poverty focus of EU and national aid programmes has been a 
particular source of criticism. Indicators such as the relative distribution of aid across low and medium 
income developing countries of national/EC aid programmes, or the use of poverty impact indicators in 
country aid evaluations, might make an important contribution to this debate. Indicators drawing upon the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) offer further performance criteria; the EC already employs 10 key 
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indicators drawn from the list of the 48 MDGs2. However these do not provide, in themselves, a 
quantitative assessment of the contribution of the EU’s aid programmes to achieving the MDG targets. 
The EC has the potential to be at the centre of this learning network and to draw upon its own and 
individual Member States experience to develop guidelines for the implementation of development 
programmes.  
  
However, as has already been observed, the OMC process may not only contribute to the enhanced 
effectiveness of aid programmes, but also contribute to policy convergence.  Although it is unrealistic to 
expect national commercial and political interests to be divorced from Member States aid policies, and for 
this to be reflected in the ambiguity of the EU’s own development assistance, the OMC may nonetheless 
contribute to clarifying the areas of divergence of interest and perhaps reduce them. Again, the OMC 
might contribute to the achievement of a more explicit poverty focus in EU aid policy, especially within the 
context of the absence of a separate Development Council. The OMC may provide an important 
organisational framework for the fostering of a development focus in external relations in the context of 
other changes in the EC’s organisation; e.g. the abolition of DG DEV or the loss of a specific 
Development Commissioner in any Commission reorganisation. Nonetheless the limitations of the OMC 
must be recognised. Although the focus upon the details of policy through the employment of indicators, 
benchmarking and peer review can appear to minimise political complexities, important divergent political 
objectives are likely to remain. 
  
Which elements of the OMC process could appropriately be applied to Development policy is a question 
in itself.  Although it is currently being applied to a number of areas of EU policy, the number of elements 
utilised and the depth of their employment, varies considerably.  In the case of pension policy the main 
OMC mechanism consists of national strategy reports, prepared without reference to common EU 
indicators. Only the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) and the European Employment Strategy 
(EES) involve the use of Community ‘Recommendations’, whilst peer review has been a very ‘light touch’ 
process across all policy areas.  For example, peer review in innovation policy was more concerned with 
identifying successful approaches than in evaluating national plans, while in employment policy it 
appeared to be more of a “learning process for a very limited community of labour market technicians and 
experts” (Casey & Gold 2005). Similarly ‘participation’ has been minimal in the BEPG, confined to 
business organisations in pension policy, and varying across Member States depending upon national 
institutional traditions in the case of the EES.  However,  ‘participation’ has been strong amongst NGOs in 
the consultations undertaken in relation to ‘social inclusion’ policy, illustrating the potential that the OMC 
has to offer. But overall Borras and Jacobsson (2004) concluded that “the OMC’s openness to various 
types of actors has not been fully exploited, especially not within the member states”. 
  
Reviews suggest a very mixed picture in the effectiveness of the OMC.  In terms of ‘top level learning’ 
there is some evidence of success, especially in the EES, social inclusion and taxation. Indicators have 
clarified goals in social inclusion, while EES Recommendations have evolved with changing policy 
priorities. The influence of the OMC extends beyond operationalising existing goals or the development of 
a ‘community of discourse’ – i.e. common terms of reference and identification of problems. In some 
policy areas common objectives and principles have been fostered by the OMC, although underlying 
areas of fundamental disagreement often remain. Even where common Regulations or guidelines have 
been agreed individual Member States may diverge in their interpretation and implementation of 
Community decisions. In some cases distinct groupings or clusters of Member States have been seen to 
follow differing approaches. A good example in the case of development policy is the Utstein group, 
consisting of the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Some commentators on the OMC have 
suggested that ‘clustering’ of states with a shared institutional tradition or objectives may offer significant 
advantages in learning diffusion and avoid the problems of ‘one size fits all’.  
  
 
2 Proportion of population below $1 per day; prevalence of child malnutrition; net primary enrolment and completion rate; gender ratio in 
education; under 5 mortality rate; proportion of 1 year-olds immunised against measles; proportion of births attended by health personnel; HIV 
prevalence amongst 15-20 year-old pregnant women; proportion of population with access to improved water sources. 
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One such important institutional difference between the Member States lies in the degree of 
independence of their individual development agencies from their Foreign Ministries. These 
arrangements often embody differing national views as to the relationship between development policy 
and general external relations considerations; paralleling the debate within the EU about the relationship 
between DG DEV and DG RELEX. Thus the learning impact of the OMC is often limited to specific policy 
issues and to certain countries, and even where there is common implementation the outcomes may 
differ, given the distinct institutional context of each Member State. 
  
In terms of ‘bottom up’ learning there is little evidence of success. As already suggested this may reflect 
limited participation in the OMC beyond national governments; the OMC as technocratic deliberation 
rather than as an extension of democratic debate.  This however may reflect the desire of governments to 
maintain control in a policy process that is inherently highly political. Even such administrative issues as 
choices of indicators and benchmarking must reflect political priorities. 
  
More fundamentally, indicators, benchmarking and peer review have been criticised as inhibiting 
institutional learning. The OMC is seen as emphasising imitation rather than innovation, reducing diversity 
and experimentation. Policy failures are often seen as as important in the learning process as successes, 
while defining success itself raises serious difficulties and often disguises differing political priorities.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Although the experience of the OMC process across a number of EU policy areas has identified some 
serious limitations, and national governments have often demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm for its full 
implementation, it has also begun to demonstrate its potential. There is nothing distinctive about EU 
development policy that should exclude it from consideration as an area for the application of the OMC 
framework. A directly administered EC aid programme, parallel to the bilateral programmes of the 
Member States, is not a unique phenomenon in EU activity; for example, it is clearly paralleled in the 
administration of the EU structural funds.  
  
The OMC has the potential to contribute to the diffusion of best practice in the bilateral aid programmes of 
the Member States and to fostering convergence in Development policy objectives, thereby clarifying the 
role of the EC itself, and administratively, contributing to the ‘complementarity’ and ‘co-ordination’ of EC 
development programmes.  A recent evaluation of the EC’s progress in co-ordination  (Lehtinen 2003) 
finds that while progress in Brussels has been frustrated by “competing political interests, bureaucratic 
resistance and conflicting views on implementation strategies” a pragmatic ‘bottom-up’ approach had 
been evolving in Delegations at the country level. Such a ‘bottom-up’ approach can form an integral part 
of the OMC, which also emphasises the importance of participation if such ‘bottom-up’ learning is to 
occur. Participation, by NGOs and businesses within the EU, and by recipient governments and civil 
society within the recipient countries, is already recognised as crucial factors in ensuring the effectiveness 
of aid programmes. Such participation can imbue development policies with additional legitimacy and can 
create a supportive domestic political lobby within the Member States. However increasing participation 
within an OMC is principally dependent upon changes in the Member State’s own domestic political 
processes.  
  
The EU faces further challenges in the implementation of its development policy arising from its recent 
enlargement to 25 members.  Over half of these former Soviet bloc countries have no tradition of 
development aid and where it does exist it is focused upon neighbouring countries, with an emphasis 
upon security priorities.  It will require considerable assistance from the EU to achieve policy co-ordination 
and a refocusing upon poverty alleviation and to establish appropriate institutional frameworks (DC-IDC 
2003). A formal OMC structure would have much to offer in facilitating this transition through peer review.   
  
But the need for further evolution in the instruments of the OMC process also has to be acknowledged.  
Benchmarking needs to be carefully applied, recognising the different institutional contexts of the Member 
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States, and used responsively in relationship to other instruments of Community learning.  To be effective 
peer review needs to be sufficiently critical but analytical.  Above all OMC instruments should not inhibit 
innovation and should recognise the important lessons to be learnt from failure as well as success.  
  
Many of the elements of the OMC can already be found within the formulation and administration of EU 
development policy and the activities of the EC. The EC has already been mandated to undertake annual 
reporting on the Member States’ implementation of the Barcelona pledges on aid targets, including their 
contribution to Financing for Development, and to propose corrective measures where progress is 
insufficient. It is explicitly recognised that this offers an “opportunity for collective benchmarking” (EC 
2004). The EC is also undertaking a co-ordinating role in relation to the Member States in regard to the 
Fast Track Initiative for ‘Education for All’, in the formulation of a common approach to land policy and 
good governance, and in the development of the EU Energy Initiative. Meanwhile one of the prime 
purposes of the Annual Action Plans is to “strengthen operational co-ordination and complementarity with 
the Member States”. Internationally, the EC reaffirmed its commitment to the DAC’s approach to 
harmonisation and dissemination of good practice at the 2003 Rome Conference on Harmonisation (EC 
2003b). Thus the elements of an OMC approach can already be found across many areas of EU 
development policy; however the formal adoption of this process would offer the significant advantage of 
providing a coherent framework and a further stimulus for the development of these policy instruments. 
 
By Stephen J. H. Dearden, Department of Economics, Manchester Metropolitan University, UK. 
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